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Modelling the Impact of New Capital Regulations on Bank Profitability 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This study models the impact of new capital regulations proposed under Basel III 
on bank profitability by constructing a stylized representative bank‟s financial 
statements. We show that the higher cost associated with a one-percentage 
increase in the capital ratio can be recovered by increasing lending spreads. The 
results indicate that in the case of scheduled commercial banks, one-percentage 
point increase in capital ratio can be recovered by increasing the bank lending 
spread by 31 basis points and would go upto an extent of 100 basis points for six-
percentage point increase assuming that the risk weighted assets are unchanged. 
We also provide the estimations for the scenarios of changes in risk weighted 
assets, changes in return on equity (ROE) and the cost of debt. 
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1. Introduction 
Banks and bankers have been at the heart of the crisis. Even as much of the reform in 
response to the crisis is still work in progress, one segment of reforms that has taken a final 
shape and is being implemented across the globe is the Basel III framework for bank capital 
regulation. However, there have been debates about the desirability and the impact of new 
capital regulations on the profitability of banks. A growing strand of literature in favour of 
the new regulations argues that there are significant macroeconomic benefits from raising 
bank equity. Higher capital requirements lower leverage and the risk of bank bankruptcies 
(Admati et al., 2010). On the other hand, there is another strand of literature, which argues 
that there could be significant costs of implementing a regime with higher capital 
requirements (BIS, 2010, and Angelini et al., 2011). Higher capital requirements will 
increase banks‟ marginal cost of loans if, contrary to the Modigliani-Miller (1958) Theorem, 
the marginal cost of capital is greater than the marginal cost of deposits, i.e. if there is a net 
cost of raising capital. In that case, a higher cost of equity financing relative to debt 
financing, would lead banks to raise the lending spreads and could slow loan growth and hold 
back the economic recovery. 
 
Increase in equity capital requirements is likely to increase the weighted average cost of 
capital and consequently banks would have to pass on the increase in cost of capital to the 
borrowers as higher lending rates. However, the important question is how much would be 
the increase in the bank loan spread and how can these inter-relations be mapped 
appropriately for estimation? Simultaneously, how much would be increase in interest 
income of the banks? Bank for International Settlements (BIS) estimates for a representative 
bank indicate that one-percentage point increase in the capital ratio raises loan spreads by 13 
basis points (bps) and a median 0.09% decline in output (BCBS, 2010). Besides, the 
additional cost of meeting the liquidity standard amounts to around 25 basis points in lending 
spreads when risk-weighted assets are unchanged. On the other hand, the lending spreads 
drop to 14 basis points or less after considering the fall in risk-weighted assets and the 
corresponding lower regulatory capital needs associated with the higher holdings of low-risk 
assets. The median decline in output as a consequence of meeting a higher liquidity 
requirement is in the order of 0.08%. 
 
 Though literature is rich with studies on bank regulation and its impact, very few 
studies are reported on the modeling of the impact of capital and liquidity requirements on 
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bank lending spreads except the one by King (2010). Country specific studies are necessitated 
in order to estimate the impact of new capital regulations under Basel III proposals on 
profitability of banks. This would provide the much needed logic, and rational approach 
towards ascertaining these impacts to policy makers as well as build a body of literature 
capturing the uniqueness of country specific features (particularly of emerging market 
economies such as that of India) in this direction. Regardless of having low or almost nil 
exposure to the toxic assets involved in the global financial crisis and a gradualist approach 
towards liberalization of the financial sector, Indian financial sector was indeed affected by 
the global financial crisis. The Basel III norms are bound to have a significant impact on the 
Indian financial sector. Although, Indian financial sector is believed to be in a comfortable 
position to meet some of the Basel III norms, the implementation of some of the other norms 
will be a challenge. In this backdrop, it is required to assess the impact of Basel III proposals 
particularly with regard to the impact on bank lending spreads, as this would have a direct 
effect on the economic output. Further, the impact on profitability of banks would greatly 
affect their capital generation capacity as well affect proliferation of their services. 
 
 In this study, we model the impact of new capital regulations under Basel III proposals 
on profitability of Indian banking sector, particularly on the bank lending spreads as well as 
the interest income. By constructing a stylized representative bank‟s financial statements for 
different classes of banking, we estimate that the higher cost associated with a one-percentage 
increase in the capital ratio can be recovered by increasing lending spreads. It is observed that 
in the case of scheduled commercial banks (SCBs), one-percentage point increase in capital 
ratio can be recovered by increasing the bank lending spread by 31 basis points and would go 
upto an extent of 100 basis points for six-percentage point increase assuming that the risk 
weighted assets are unchanged. We also provide the estimations for the scenarios of changes 
in risk weighted assets, changes in return on equity (ROE) and the cost of debt. Assuming 
that RWAs are unchanged, we forecast that for 1-percentage point increase in capital ratio, 
interest income would raise by 17 percentage points. Similarly, for 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6-percentage 
point increase in capital ratio given that RWAs are unchanged, interest income would 
increase by 26, 37, 44, 53 and 62 percentage points respectively. When RWAs are assumed 
to be decreased by 20 percentage points, for 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6-percentage point increase in 
capital ratio, interest income would increase by 14, 20, 26, 32, 38 and 44 percentage points 
respectively. 
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 The design of the representative bank model is useful in mapping the changes in the 
bank‟s capital structure and in understanding as to how the composition of assets has an 
effect on the different components of net income using the standard accounting relationships. 
Even though banks can adjust to the regulatory reforms in several ways, this study supposes 
that they seek to pass on any additional costs by raising the cost of loans to end-customers. It 
is believed that by computing the change in net income and shareholder‟s equity associated 
with the regulatory changes, we can compute the increase in lending spreads required to 
achieve a given return on equity (ROE). In view of the enormous significance of the impact 
of Basel III on banks, this research outcome benefits the practitioners in the industry and 
researchers apart from contributing to the literature on bank regulation and risk management 
with newer and topical approach for quantification of the impacts of new regulatory 
standards. 
 
 The remainder of the paper is presented as follows. We present the theoretical 
considerations encompassing the recent related literature in section 2. We describe our 
modelling of the impact of new capital regulations under Basel III proposals and the 
methodology of estimation in section 3. We present the description of the data employed for 
the analysis in section 4. Results and discussion is presented in section 5 followed by 
conclusion in section 6. 
 
2. Theoretical Considerations 
 Though there is a wealth of literature on bank capital and regulation (refer Dewatripont 
and Tirole, 1994; Bhattacharya et al., 1998; Santos, 2001; and VanHoose, 2007), very few 
studies have highlighted on the aspect of loan pricing. Repullo and Suarez (2004) have 
analyzed the loan pricing implications of capital requirements in a credit market where, as in 
the model underlying the internal ratings based (IRB) approach of Basel II, loan default rates 
are driven by a single factor of systematic risk. Their loan pricing equation entails that low 
risk firms will accomplish decreases in their loan rates by borrowing from banks adopting the 
IRB approach, while high-risk firms will evade increases in their loan rates by borrowing 
from banks that embrace the less risk-sensitive standardized approach of Basel II. However, 
they contemplate a perfectly competitive market for business loans where, as in the model 
underlying the internal ratings based (IRB) approach of Basel II; a single risk factor expounds 
the correlation in defaults across firms. 
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Another recent study in this direction is by Ruthenberg and Landskroner (2008), who 
analyze and estimate the possible effects of the new rules on the pricing of bank loans using 
Israeli economic data and data of a leading Israeli bank, including probability of default of its 
retail and corporate customers. Their loan equation is founded on a model of a banking firm 
facing uncertainty operating in an imperfectly competitive loan market. They show that high 
quality corporates and retail customers will experience a decline in loan interest rates in 
(large) banks that, will embrace the IRB approach. On the other hand, high-risk customers 
will benefit by shifting to (small) banks that will assume the Standardized approach. This 
study is distinctive in their approach by estimating the loan spreads with loan rate equation 
involving the explanatory variables such as; loan loss provisions, market share, cost of debt 
(secondary market), and cost of equity sensitivity. Elliott (2010) is another significant of the 
recent studies that has analysed the loan pricing implications of the proposed higher capital 
requirements under Basel III. By providing an accounting-based analysis, Elliott (2010) has 
estimated how much the interest rate charged on loans would increase if banks are required to 
hold more equity. However, in the stylized model of Elliot, banks hold only loans funded by 
equity, deposits and wholesale funding and the interest rate on loan is priced in order to meet 
a targeted ROE after covering for the cost of liabilities and other fixed expenses (such as 
administrative costs and expected loan losses). Using the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) data for aggregate United States (US) banking system, Elliott has 
calculated that if the ratio of common equity required for a given loan is raised by 2% with no 
other changes, banks would need to raise lending spreads by 39 basis points (bps) to maintain 
the target ROE of 15%. Further, if the ROE is allowed to fall to 14.5%, lending spread would 
have to rise only by 9 bps. Elliott summarizes that through a combination of actions the US 
banking system would be able to adjust to higher capital requirements and ensure that they 
would not have a strong effect on the pricing or availability of bank loans. The merit of the 
Elliott‟s method is in its simplicity as well as the intuition it provides on pricing of loans and 
the alternatives available to banks to adjust to higher capital levels. Drawing from the 
literature discussed earlier, we develop and present our methodology in the ensuing section. 
 
3. Methodology 
The purpose of this section is to map the capital and liquidity requirements as per Basel 
III
1
 to bank lending spreads
2
. This estimation supposes that the return on equity (ROE) and 
                                                          
1 The 1988 Basel Accord is referred to, as Basel I and the 2004 revision of the same is known as Basel II.   
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the cost of debt are unaffected, with no change in other sources of income and on the same 
line of thought; it is further assumed that there is no reduction in operating expenses. Such a 
mapping endows researchers with a useful instrument to analyze the impact of regulatory 
changes on the cost of credit and the real economy. A raise in the interest rate charged on 
bank loans is believed to reduce loan demand, all else equal, leading to a drop in investment 
and output.  
 
This methodology has been employed in the BCBS‟s assessment of the long-term 
economic impact of the proposed regulatory changes on output (BCBS, 2010; King, 2010). 
Further, the benefit of these estimates of changes in bank lending spreads could be found in 
using them as inputs into dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models that have been 
augmented to include a micro-founded banking sector such as Goodfriend and McCallum 
(2007), or as a proxy for increased financial frictions in macroeconomic models that lack a 
financial sector. Motivated by similar studies such as Repullo and Suarez (2004) and 
Ruthenberg and Landskroner (2008) for Basel II framework, this mapping exercise attempts 
to illustrate the potential loan pricing implications for the banks under the Basel III proposals. 
 
A representative bank
3
 is designed to map the changes in the bank‟s capital structure 
and to understand how the composition of assets has an effect on the different components of 
net income using the standard accounting relationships. Even though banks can adjust to the 
regulatory reforms in several ways, this study supposes that they seek to pass on any 
additional costs by raising the cost of loans to end-customers. It is believed that by computing 
the change in net income and shareholder‟s equity associated with the regulatory changes, we 
can compute the increase in lending spreads required to achieve a given return on equity 
(ROE). This approach, of course, is not without limitations as it does not formally model the 
choices faced by the banks, nor does it offers estimates based on an optimization in a general 
equilibrium setting. On other hand, as a substitute, it offers a starting point for understanding 
the behavioural response of banks to a regulatory change in a most acceptable practical 
setting. It enables the researchers and the policy makers in determining the impact given a 
country‟s institutional setting, its banking sector and the elasticity of loan demand. Though 
this approach can suggest the potential magnitude of the change in lending spreads, deciding 
whether banks would be able to pass on these costs to borrowers is beyond the scope of this 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
2 Lending spread is the spread between the interest rate charged on bank loans and the cost of bank‟s liabilities.  
3 The author is grateful to Michel R King for suggesting the suitability of this approach   
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study. Further, this approach focuses on the „steady state‟ and does not consider the transition 
period to the higher regulatory requirements
4
. In the steady state, the supply of bank credit is 
considered as exogenous and credit rationing is ignored. It is further implied that banks price 
their loans to meet the marginal cost of loan production. 
 
The approach is modified to suit the needs of Indian banking system and is 
understandably illustrative and general in nature and could be used to estimate the impact on 
lending spreads from a change in bank‟s capital structure, assets composition, risk weighted 
assets and the corporate tax paid by these banks. Also, as this approach does not rely much on 
the availability of very large datasets (which are obviously the requirement in effective use of 
statistical methods); it is acceptable particularly for practitioners for easy comprehension. 
Another advantage of this approach is that it explains how a given change can alter the bank‟s 
profitability and indicates to different possible behavioural responses to the regulations 
including the unintended consequences. Further, this approach being a bottom-up, micro-
founded one, it offers a useful complement to top-down, structural models where the 
modeling of the financial sector is necessarily parsimonious. Although this approach is 
founded on several assumptions, all the assumptions are apparent, realistic, and simple and 
can be modified to check the sensitivity of the results. The methodology holds good in the 
case of Indian banking as the banks are allowed to reprice their loan books in accordance 
with the changes in their base rates in the much more liberalized new regulatory environment. 
We notice in the real world, that banks do keep repricing their loan books in line with the 
needs of their asset-liability management. 
 
This approach focuses on only two elements of Basel III proposals viz, the first relating 
to raising the minimum capital requirement and the second relating to enhanced liquidity 
requirement. Firstly, though the previous Basel accords (Basel I and II) specified capital 
adequacy rules for minimum capital adequacy ratios, however, they could not absorb the 
losses during the recent crisis. In this backdrop, Basel III stipulates higher levels of tangible 
common equity. In order to achieve this, banks need to increase their common equity with 
high-quality capital. This can be achieved by deleveraging banks‟ balance sheets by 
offloading assets in the near term. Secondly, as per the Basel III framework, banks are 
required to meet two new liquidity standard requirements viz, liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) 
                                                          
4 The transition to the higher capital and liquidity requirements is the focus on the interim report of the Macroeconomic 
Assessment Group (2010).   
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and net stable funding ratio (NSFR). The LCR is employed to identify the amount of 
unencumbered, high quality, liquid assets that can be made use of to offset cash outflows. 
Essentially, LCR aims to ensure that banks have adequate funding liquidity to survive at least 
one month of a situation of stressed funding. As the related data (requires details on a bank‟s 
expected cash outflows over a one-month period) is not available for researchers, it cannot be 
calibrated. The aim of NSFR is to address maturity mismatches between assets and liabilities. 
NSFR establishes a minimum adequate amount of stable funding based on the liquidity 
characteristics of a bank‟s assets over a one-year horizon. This approach estimates the cost to 
meet the NSFR. This approach mostly follows the footsteps of King (2010) in estimating the 
impact of capital and liquidity requirements on the lending spreads. 
 
This section of the study does not focus on measurement of credit risk, but on the 
relationships between a bank‟s capital structure, asset composition and their impact on bank‟s 
profitability. This greater level of detail is vital for understanding as to how the banks 
respond to the Basel III regulatory reforms. Both theorists and researchers are quite 
concerned in understanding these relationships, albeit they may be too complex to model 
parsimoniously. By offering greater detail on the significance of different sources of capital, 
the present study also contributes to a growing literature on bank capital structure choices and 
their impact on lending
5
. Largely, Elliott as well as King‟s approaches influence the approach 
of this section of the study. By actual usage of the balance sheet data to compute the 
regulatory impact, it takes into account the composition of the assets and liabilities as well the 
very important distinction between the assets and risk weighted assets. Further, it models the 
cost to meet the NSFR unambiguously, elucidating the sensitivity of this computation to the 
inputs. This study attempts to compare two steady states, namely, one with and other one 
without the regulatory requirements. Firstly, we consider the impact of higher capital 
requirements in isolation, and then the cost to meet the NSFR is computed assuming the 
higher capital requirements have already been met. Lastly, by considering the potential 
synergies between the two regulatory enhancements it models the capital and liquidity 
requirements together. 
 
 
                                                          
5 While Marcus (1983), Froot and Stein (1998), Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006), Koziol and Lawrenz (2009), and 
Memmel and Raupach (2010) analysed the bank capital structure choices, Thakor (1996), Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004), 
Fabi et al. (2005) and Inderst and Mueller (2008) study  the relationship between capital and bank lending.   
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3.1 The Model 
A typical bank‟s assets consist of cash and central bank balances, interbank claims, trading 
assets, loans and advances, investments in securities, and other assets (Eqn 1).  
 
 
 
Where Astsit represents the assets of the bank „i‟ at time„t‟. Similarly, Casit, IBCit, TAit, LAit,  
 Invit and OAit represent cash, inter-bank claims, trading assets, loans and advances, 
investments and other assets respectively of the bank „i‟ at time „t‟. Similarly, total liabilities 
of a bank typically consist of deposits, interbank funding, trading liabilities, wholesale 
funding (e.g. borrowing), and other liabilities (Eqn 2). Shareholder‟s equity represents the 
residual claim of shareholders after deducting the liabilities of creditors from total assets. 
 
 
where Liabit, Depit, IBFit, TLit, BDit, OLit represent liabilities, deposits,  inter-bank funding
6
, 
trading liabilities, bank debt (also called bank borrowings) and other liabilities respectively of 
the bank „i‟ at time „t‟. When we look at a bank‟s consolidated income statement we find 
various components that generate net income (Eqn 3). Net income can be explained as the 
sum of two broad categories of income viz., net interest income, and non-interest income. 
While the loans and advances, investments and interbank claims generate the interest income, 
interest expense is due to the interest payable by the bank on its deposits, inter-bank funding, 
and bank debt (borrowings). Non-interest income can be categorized into trading income and 
other income. While the trading income is generated by trading assets and liabilities, other 
income is generated by the fees and commissions levied by the bank. Thus, Net income of the 
bank equals difference between the total revenues and the operating expenses & taxes. 
 
 
where, NIit, ILit, OIIit, IEit, NIIit, OEit, and Txit represent the net income, income loans, other 
interest income, interest expense, non-interest income, operating expenses and tax rate 
respectively for the bank „i‟ at time „t‟. After having specified the components of different 
assets, their financing, and the income they generate, in the next step we identify the costs of 
                                                          
6 Indian financial system in recent years is experiencing the ascendance of non-bank financial institutions in the interbank 
market. The phenomenon that could be explained by direct foreign investments due to interest rate differential with 
developed countries has possibly altered the lending spread strategies of Indian banks. As such, this methodology has the 
limitation of not assessing non-banks role in the interbank lending market. 
Astsit  = Casit + IBCit + TAit + LAit + Invit + OAit 
Liabit = Depit + IBFit + TLit + BDit + OLit 
NIit = [(ILit + OIIit – IEit) + NIIit – OEit ] * (1-Txit) 
1 
2 
3 
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different sources of capital. It is known that bank borrowings include both short-term and 
longer-term liabilities. Short-term liabilities such as interbank funding, trading liabilities, and 
debt maturing within one year need to be charged with an interest rate that is normally lower 
than the interest rate charged on long-term debt. Even though the one-year threshold may 
appear arbitrary, it is imperative as it is specified in NSFR definition. As such, bank debt 
(borrowings) is split into a portion of debt maturing within one year (ρt) and a remainder of 
long-term debt (Eqn 4). 
 
 
Where, BDit, BDit*ρt and BDit*(1- ρt) represent bank debt (borrowings), short-term bank debt 
and long-term bank debt respectively for the bank „i‟ at time„t‟. This distinction is imperative 
in computing the cost to meet the NSFR and cost of a bank‟s liabilities. As the cost of inter-
bank funding, trading liabilities, deposits and bank debt (borrowings) are generally not 
disclosed in the bank‟s financial statements these costs are aggregated as interest expense 
(Eqn 5). 
 
 
Where rdep represents the cost of deposits, rBD≤1year represents the cost of short-term debt of 
less than or equal to one year and rltDB represents the cost of long-term debt. Further, it is also 
required to distinguish the cost of three types of liabilities namely cost of deposits, cost of 
short-term liabilities (maturing within one year) and cost of long-term liabilities. Using the 
representative bank‟s ratio interest expense to interest paying liabilities, we can calculate; 
            
 
The cost of deposits is set equal to some value x%. Then, to calculate cost of short-term 
liabilities it is set as x% + 100 bps. 
 
 
Similarly, the cost of long-term liabilities is assumed as x% + 200 bps
7
. 
 
 
                                                          
7 There could be an argument that the variables should have to be calibrated with market data. However, in an empirical 
estimation based on the international/national standards, there is a need to make standard assumptions for the purpose of 
computation. Therefore, the margins of 100 basis points for cost of short-term liabilities and 200 basis points for cost of 
long-term liabilities are believed to be rightly adopted. 
BDit = BDit * ρt + BDit * (1- ρt) 4 
IEit = rdep * Depit  + rBD≤1year * (IBFit + TLit  + BDit * ρt  )+ rltDB * BDit * (1- ρt) 
rdep = x 
 
rBD≤1year  = x + 0.01 
rltDB = x + 0.02 
 
5 
6 
7 
8 
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It is so assumed that the lowest cost for deposits is consistent with the existence of deposit 
insurance schemes, which reduce the risk of this source of funding relative to other liabilities. 
Founding on these assumptions, the cost of each type of liabilities is computed using equation 
5. The ultimate source of bank funding is the shareholder‟s equity. The popular measure of 
the expected return for a bank‟s shareholders is the long-term average ROE, which is the ratio 
of net income to shareholder‟s equity (Eqn 9). 
 
 
Where Requity is the cost of equity and ROE measures the amount of profit earned per unit of 
shareholder‟s equity Eit of a bank „i‟ in a given year„t‟. Regardless of the fact that this ratio is 
very volatile, over a long-time horizon it bestows a measure of the return expected by 
shareholders. Nevertheless, shareholder‟s equity may consist of various equity-like securities 
with different features and claims on dividends; we can assume that by and large all equity 
securities bear the same cost as common equity, which can bias the cost estimates upwards. 
The expected return on common equity is considered to be the highest across different 
sources of bank capital, as common equity has the lowest residual claim on the bank‟s assets. 
Following this rational and in consistency with theories such as the Modigliani-Miller 
theorem, the relative costs of different forms of capital in „normal times‟ are expected to 
follow the relationship as detailed in Eqn 10. 
 
 
Since this relationship may be disregarded for a bank in financial distress; during normal 
times this correlation ensures that different capital providers receive an expected return 
commensurate with the risk of their investment. In addition, it is essential to distinguish 
between regulatory capital ratios and accounting ratios based on a bank‟s balance sheet. As 
per the existing banking regulations, the quantity of capital that must be held for regulatory 
purposes is associated with the risk-weighted assets. As such, the quantity of RWAs used in 
calculating capital adequacy ratios, however, need not equal the quantity of total assets found 
on a bank‟s balance sheet. Accordingly, capital adequacy ratio is defined as qualifying capital 
(tier 1 capital) divided by RWAs (Eqn 11). 
 
 
 
requity  = ROE = __NIit______ 
               Eit 
9 
rdep  < rBD≤1year  < rltDB  < requity 10 
CAR = ___Eit______ 
          RWAit 
11 
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Where RWAit represents the risk weighted assets and Eit represents equity of a bank „i‟ in a 
given year„t‟. We can now attempt to compute the impact of higher capital requirements on 
lending spreads given the relationships presented in Eqn 1 to 11. However, we need to 
emphasise that a unit of shareholder‟s equity is increased as against RWAs in order to meet 
the targeted capital adequacy ratio. It is assumed that the size and composition of the balance 
sheet is held constant but the shareholders‟ equity and total liabilities are altered. A 1-
percentage point increase in shareholders‟ equity against RWA is in general smaller than the 
total assets (Eqn 12). 
 
 
It is further assumed that increase in shareholder‟s equity is matched by an equal and 
offsetting decrease in the amount of liabilities. Since long-term debt being the most expensive 
form of liabilities, would be the first among the liabilities to be replaced with equity
8
. 
Accordingly, Eqn (13) follows as below. 
 
 
 
Now we arrive at a situation where the change in capital structure results in increase in 
the cost of capital, as the bank‟s debt is substituted with equity that is more expensive. 
Therefore, net income should rise, all else equal, since the decline in the quantity of debt 
outstanding decreases interest expense and increases net income (Eqn 3 & 5). When the net 
income rises, ROE typically cascades as the relative increase in equity in the denominator is 
higher than the increase in net income in the numerator (Eqn 9). This correlation holds well 
when the pre-tax cost of debt is lower than the cost of equity (Eqn 10). 
 
The drop in bank leverage should be expected to lower the expected returns of creditors 
and shareholders. In theory, both the „cost of equity‟ and the „cost of debt‟ should reduce as 
leverage decreases and the risk of default lessens. Though the theoretical postulations about 
changing capital structure are explicit, it may not be evident that these theories always hold 
good in practice. It is empirically found that the historical return earned by investors in bank 
stocks is much lower than would be forecasted based on the degree of bank leverage. One 
                                                          
8 Banks will not likely reduce the quantity of deposits, as they represent one of the least expensive forms of liabilities and 
help meet the NSFR. Likewise, interbank funding and trading liabilities are funded in short-term markets and are less 
expensive than long-term debt. On the contrary, reducing trading liabilities may result in drop in trading income.   
CAR = Eit + ∆CAR * RWAt+1 12 
∆BDit = -∆ Eit 13 
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justification for this inconsistency is that banks may be looked at as having an implicit 
government guarantee, which reduces the risk of default ex ante, thus leading bank 
shareholders to expect a lower expected return. Likewise, the cost of deposits indicate an 
implicit subsidy due to the presence of deposit insurance schemes, while the cost of 
wholesale funding is also lower than observed for corporations with similar levels of 
financial leverage
9
.  
 
The primary assumption of this study is that the bank‟s ROE and cost of long-term debt 
are unchanged regardless of the reduction in leverage. This logic holds good given the 
existence of deposit insurance and implicit guarantees that currently underpin the low cost of 
bank liabilities. On other hand, if a bank‟s ROE and cost of debt are allowed to decline, the 
impact on lending spreads gets contracted. We assume that banks respond to the fall in ROE 
by increasing the lending spread (α) charged on loans. However, this lending spread as a 
variable cannot be observed directly, as it is not disclosed by banks. We can capture this 
effect in a model as an increase in the average spread charged on the entire loan portfolio 
(Eqn 14). 
 
 
The extent of increase in lending spreads is dependent on the increase in net income, which 
exactly offsets the increase in the cost of capital, allowing ROE to be unaffected at its prior 
value (Eqn 15). 
 
 
 
This modeling offers a better measure of the rise in lending spreads needed to offset the 
fall in ROE coupled with 1 percentage point increase in the capital ratio. It can be stated that 
as long as long-term debt is substituted by equity and the costs of debt and equity are 
unaffected, there is a linear relationship between the lending spreads the capital ratio. As 
cheaper forms of liabilities are replaced with equity that is more expensive; the rise in lending 
                                                          
9 Empirically, one can recognize an inverse relationship between bank capital ratios and historical ROEs, with bank ROEs 
lower for more highly capitalized banks. In view of the lack of data on secondary market prices for bank debt, the empirical 
correlation between bank capital ratios and the cost of wholesale funding is not so clear.   
ILit+1 = ILit + α * LAit+1 14 
15 
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spreads is higher. In general, the estimate of the marginal cost to increase the total capital 
ratio is not affected by the levels of any variables. For instance, the results are indifferent to 
the level of tax rates, provided, they are the same before and after the capital change, as taxes 
will only change the level of net income (Eqn 3). While a lower tax rate will lead to a higher 
level of net income for a given level of shareholders equity (Eqn 9), the impact on lending 
spreads is unaffected as long as the tax rate is the same before and after the change in capital 
structure. In a world with no taxes, for example, an increase in equity relative to debt results 
in the same change in lending spreads. Thus, the relationships modeled in equations (1) to 
(15) enable us to predict how sensitive the results are to different scenarios of assumptions. 
The results of the analysis are presented after the ensuing section about modeling the 
mapping of net stable funding ratio (NSFR) to lending spreads. 
 
3.1.1 Modeling the Impact of NSFR to Lending Spreads  
Net Stable Funding Ratio is intended to promote higher levels of medium and long-
term funding of the assets and activities of banking organizations. As a metric NSFR sets a 
minimum adequate amount of stable, funding based on the liquidity tendencies of an 
institution‟s assets and activities over a one-year horizon. BCBS states that this standard is 
designed to act as a minimum enforcement mechanism in order to complement the liquidity 
coverage ratio (LCR) and reinforce other supervisory efforts by promoting structural changes 
in the liquidity risk profiles of institutions away from short-term funding mismatches and 
toward more stable, longer-term funding of assets and business activities. Since NSFR 
involves several variables, computing cost of meeting the NSFR is intricate than the cost to 
meet higher capital requirements. Further, the complexity is further compounded as the inputs 
to the NSFR are not disclosed in a bank‟s financial statements. In this direction, BCBS in its 
December 2009 consultative document has proposed a definition and a calibration for the 
NSFR. A simplified version is adopted here (Eqn 16). 
 
 
 
 
 
16 
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While the numerator quantifies the sources of available stable funding (ASF), the 
denominator encapsulates required stable funding (RSF), with a factor or haircut applied on 
the basis of their expected liquidation value under stressed conditions
10
. Higher weights are 
given to funding sources that are more stable and least likely to wane under stressed 
conditions. Obviously, to achieve a targeted NSFR, banks ought to have an ASF higher than 
their RSF, leading to a NSFR of 1 or greater than 1 (or 100% or more than 100% in 
percentage terms). An optional scenario with other possible options to achieve NSFR is 
illustrated in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: An optional strategy to meet NSFR 
 
An Optional Scenario to achieve NSFR 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         Source: Developed by author 
Possible options: 
(i) Increase term loans particularly to corporates and retails as well 
(ii) Reduce the contingent liabilities 
(iii) Reduce all other assets 
(iv) Issue debt and purchase government bonds 
 
Original level 
of NSFR 
Increase 
Tier 1 
Capital 
Increase 
Long term 
debt 
Increase 
high quality 
investments 
Reduce risk-weighted assets 
Increase share 
of  investments 
in total assets 
Increase the 
share of  
Ultra liquid 
assets  
Achieve the 
targeted 
NSFR 
 
Normally, banks can increase their NSFR by extending the maturity of their funding 
while reducing the maturity or riskiness of their assets. Assuming that holding higher equity 
relative to debt improves the NSFR, the analysis presupposes that banks have already met the 
higher capital requirements. When the banks lengthen the maturity of their bank borrowings 
beyond one year (Eqn 10), the maturity extension thus caused increases the numerator of the 
NSFR (Eqn 16) and raises interest expense (Eqn 5) as the cost of long term borrowings (bank 
debt) is assumed to be higher than cost of short-term bank borrowing (Eqn 10). Thus, higher 
interest expenses all else equal leads to a fall in net income (Eqn 3) and ROE (Eqn 9).  
 
Subsequently, banks raise the share of higher-rated, liquid bonds in their investment 
portfolios (increasing their holdings of government bonds and corporate (or covered) bonds 
                                                          
10 In simple understanding, available stable funding (ASF) includes; equity, long-term debt, long-term liabilities, 85 percent 
of stable deposits and 70 percent of other deposits. On the other hand, required stable funding (RSF) includes; 5 percent of 
government debt, 50 percent of corporate loans, 85 percent of retail loans, and 100 percent of other assets. 
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rated AA or higher). Increase in holdings of higher-rated securities thus shrinks the 
denominator of the NSFR (Eqn 16), but is linked with a decrease in interest income and net 
income (Eqn 3). Accordingly, loss of interest income is a function of the difference in returns 
from holding more liquid, higher rated securities relative to higher-yielding but less liquid 
assets. This opportunity cost which we can term it as „θt‟ captures the lower return from 
holding higher-rated and more liquid bonds (Eqn 17). 
 
 
 
Banks‟ capability to raise the NSFR by varying the composition of existing investments 
is also restricted to some extent by the existing quantity of investments relative to total assets. 
In case the changes in the composition of the investments are not adequate to meet the NSFR, 
banks would have to resort to alter the composition of their assets to some extent. In this 
setting, banks are implicit to increase the size of investments while reducing “Other Assets” 
(OAit). When Other Assets (which are assumed to earn higher return than government bonds) 
are reduced interest income decreases (Eqn 18). 
 
 
 
Where, rinv is the return on investments of a bank. When we consider the measures taken to 
meet the NSFR, they tend to reduce the net income (Eqn 3) as well as reduce ROE (Eqn 9). 
However, the banks obviously do not like to see a fall in their ROE and hence may seek to 
replace the lost income by raising the loan spreads (Eqn 15). This increase is over and above 
the earlier increase to meet the higher capital requirements.  
 
A number of synergies co-exist in meeting the increase in capital requirements and 
meeting the NSFR. One of the significant synergies can take place by increasing the holdings 
of high quality, liquid investments. This change in a bank‟s investment11 (investments include 
loans and advances also in this part of discussion) portfolio decreases a bank‟s RWAs and 
results in lowering of the quantity of equity required to meet a target CAR (Eqn 11 and 12). 
The lesser is the need of equity the lesser is the impact on the required loan spread. On the 
other hand, if lesser amount of equity has to be raised, would lead to lesser increase in the 
                                                          
11 Investments include loans and advances also in this part of discussion 
Invit  = Invit . θt + Invit . (1- θt) 17 
OIIit+1 = [OIIit + Invit+1 * ∆ (1- θt+1)* rinv + ∆ OAit * rinv - ∆Cash * rinv]  18 
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lending spread? Since the banks do not report as to how they calculate their RWAs, the 
impact of this change can only be captured indirectly based on some assumptions. The first of 
such assumptions is that high-risk investments in lower-rated corporate bonds bear a higher 
risk-weight than the government bonds. For instance, government bonds bear a 0% risk 
weight while lower-rated or unrated corporate securities bear a risk weight of 100% or greater 
under the Basel II regulations. In such a scenario, RWA gets affected for each unit of 
corporate securities and loans being sold and replaced with high rated securities and 
government bonds (θt) (Eqn 19). 
 
 
Thus, the synergy between meeting the NSFR, lowering RWAs, and reducing the 
equity that must be held to meet a target CAR turn out to be more important as the quantity of 
higher-rated securities held in a bank‟s investment portfolio increases. The analysis presented 
below elucidates that the incremental cost of meeting the NSFR decreases as the CAR 
increases as more equity increases the NSFR (Eqn 16). 
 
3.2. Model motivated from OECD Approach 
In this section, we model the impact of new capital regulations under Basel III 
proposals on bank lending spreads drawing motivation from the OECD approach, wherein it 
is based on accounting identities applied to stylized banking sector balance sheets. We 
consider two categories of bank assets for the purpose of the assessment: (i) lending assets of 
the banks (LA) that comprise bank‟s loans and advances to households and non-financial 
corporations held on banking books, and (ii) Investments and Other assets of the banks (IOA), 
which represent a residual category that comprises assets held on trading books, interbank 
assets, government bonds and other remaining assets. Further, one of the significant 
assumptions is that a bank can directly affect the pricing of LA by adjusting its lending 
spread. The pricing of IOA is mainly market driven and it is therefore assumed that a bank 
cannot directly affect the pricing of these assets. The balance-sheet identity presented in Eqn 
(1) postulates that the return on bank assets is equal to bank funding costs, which are 
determined by the cost of liabilities and the cost of equity.  
  
 
∆ RWA  = (Invit . θt - Invit+1 * θt+1) * RWOA 19 
rLAt  x LAit  + rIOAt  x IOAit = rLiabt x Liabit + rEt  x Eit 1 
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Eqn (2) incorporates a one-percentage point increase in bank capital relative to risk-weighted 
assets. An increase in bank capital will affect bank liability and equity structures and as a 
consequence, the overall bank funding cost.  
 
 
 
To maintain equilibrium for the change in funding cost banks are assumed to adjust their 
lending spreads, while their costs of equity and debt financing are assumed to remain 
constant (Eqn 3).  
 
 
Combining equations (1) and (2) leads to Equation (3), which shows the increase in bank 
lending spreads as a result of a one-percentage point increase in the ratio of bank capital to 
risk-weighted assets. Where, LAit represents the percentage of loans and advances to total 
assets, IOAit - the percentage of investments and other assets to total assets, Liabit  - the 
percentage of liabilities to total assets, Eit - the percentage of common equity to total assets, 
RWAit - the percentage of risk-weighted assets to total assets, rLAt   - the percentage or return 
on advances, rIOAt - the percentage of return on investments and other assets, rLiabt - the 
percentage of cost of borrowing, and rEt  represents the percentage of cost of equity. 
  
4. Data Description 
A more popular definition for the lending spread is that it is the difference between the 
interest rate charged on loans and the rate paid on deposits (Repullo and Suarez, 2004). 
Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) determine the lending spread as the difference between the 
uncollateralized lending rate and the interbank rate. Further, the rate charged by banks on 
loans varies on several factors like; terms of the loan, the characteristics of the borrower, the 
collateral provided and other costs associated with the loan. For constructing a representative 
bank‟s financial statements, the stylized balance sheet and income statement data for SCBs in 
India is collected from Capitaline Plus database
12
, respective websites of the banks under 
study, RBI database, and Basel II Pillar III disclosures of respective banks from their 
                                                          
12 Capitaline Plus provides fundamental and market data on more than 20,000 Indian listed and unlisted companies, 
classified under more than 300 industries, along with powerful analytic tools. Extensive data and analysis on every company 
profile, directors, 10-year financials (P&L, balance sheet, cash flow, consolidated financial data, segment data, forex data, 
R&D data, ratios, etc), quarterly results, ownership pattern, finished products, raw materials, share price data, directors' 
report, management discussion, notes to account, business news, corporate events, etc. www.capitaline.com 
rLAt +1 xLAit +rIOAt x IOAit = rLiabt x(Liabit - RWAit ) +(rEt x RWAit )   
                                                                   100                   100                                                                                                                                    
  (rLAt +1 - rLAt ) =  (rEt - rLiabt)/ LAit  x    RWAit 
                                                                              100 
3 
2 
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websites. The data employed for analysis is for the period from 2002 to 2011 as the 
Capitaline Plus database provides complete datasets only for a ten-year period (Table 1).  
Table 1: Sample distribution by category of SCBs 
Year Public Sector Banks Private Sector Banks SCBs 
2002 30 87 117 
2003 30 94 124 
2004 30 93 123 
2005 30 97 127 
2006 30 88 118 
2007 30 86 116 
2008 30 83 113 
2009 29 69 98 
2010 29 87 116 
2011 28 85 113 
Source: Compiled by the author 
IDBI Bank Ltd. in spite of its dual nature it is also included amongst the public sector banks. 
Public sector banks category also includes the State Bank of India and its associate banks. 
Private Banks also include the foreign banks operating in India. SCBs include both the public 
and private banks. 
 
This study employs the consolidated entity wherever available, taking the last filing in a 
calendar year. Table 1 provides the details of banks by category and year. The number of 
banks varies by year due to the merger, closure, or entry of a new foreign bank in the year. 
Capitaline Plus database does not report RWAs directly in its datasets. Instead the quantity of 
RWAs is collected from the more authenticate source; i.e the Basel II Pillar III disclosures of 
respective banks from their websites. Since the Capitaline Plus database presents the data for 
category of banks, there was no problem of the outliers and the requirement of winsorization 
of capital adequacy ratios to reduce the impact of outliers. Based on the data described, a 
representative bank balance sheet and income statement is constructed for each category of 
banks by taking the weighted average values for each component of the balance sheet and the 
income statement for banks in each category of study. The weights are based on total assets 
of the category of the banks
13
. Table 2 shows the stylized balance sheet and income statement 
for the representative bank of SCBs and all components are shown as a percentage of total 
assets.  
 
 
 
                                                          
13 All variables are standardized by dividing by bank‟s total assets in each year 
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Table 2: Stylized balance sheet and income statement of SCBs  
Balance Sheet Average Income Statement Average 
Cash & Balances with RBI 5.59 Interest Income 6.21 
Interbank claims 4.09 Interest expended 3.97 
Investments & securities 31.48 A. Net Interest Income 2.24 
Loans & Advances 53.23 B. Other Income 1.28 
Fixed Assets 0.99 C. Total Revenues (A+B) 3.52 
Other Assets 4.63 D. Personnel Expenses 0.95 
TOTAL ASSETS 100.00 E. Other admin expenses 1.37 
Deposits by Customers(retail and 
corporate) 
75.65 
F. Operating Expenses 
(D+E) 
2.32 
Inter-bank funding (borrowing) 9.16 G. Operating Profit (C-F) 1.20 
Other Liabilities & Provisions 8.06 H. Tax Provision 0.36 
TOTAL LIABILITIES 92.88 I. Net Income (G-H) 0.84 
Capital 1.05 
  
Reserves Total 6.06 
  
Equity Share Warrants 0.00 
  
Equity Application Money 0.00 Return on Equity (ROE) (%) 0.15 
Total CAPITAL 7.12 Leverage Multiple 6.60 
TOTAL LIABILITIES & CAPITAL 100.00 
  
Risk Weighted Assets / Total Assets 65.77 Average Effective Tax Rate  33.00% 
 
Loans & advances represent about more than half of the typical bank‟s assets, followed 
by investments & securities (31.48%), cash and balances with RBI (5.59%), other assets 
(4.63%) and interbank claims (4.09%). These assets are funded mainly by deposits (75.65%), 
bank borrowings or interbank funding (9.6%). Shareholder‟s equity is to the extent of 7.12%. 
RWAs constitute around 65.77% total assets on average. This ratio is significant when 
calculating the cost of meeting the higher capital requirement. Table 2 also shows the 
consolidated income statement for the representative bank. In terms of the composition of net 
income, net interest income is 2.24% with non-interest income also important at 1.28%. Total 
operating expenses constitute 2.32% of total assets. Personnel expenses represent around 
41% of total operating expenses. Net income (or ROA) is 0.8%, implying that the average 
ROE is around 15%. The average historical corporate tax rate is accepted at 33%. 
 
5. Results and Discussion 
The study presupposes that the ROE and cost of debt do not change with lower 
leverage. We also assume that banks pass on any additional costs to lending spreads, and do 
not adjust other sources of income or operating expenses. For each category, the impact on 
lending spreads is calculated (i) assuming no change in RWA, and (ii) allowing RWA to 
decline as steps are taken to meet the NSFR (namely holding more government bonds relative 
to other investments). Within each scenario, the costs are calculated for incremental increases 
in capital ratios of 1 percentage point. These costs are linear in the increase in capital ratios. 
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Some of the important assumptions that have been considered in this section of the study are 
detailed below: 
(i) A representative bank balance sheet and income statement for each category of banks 
under study is for the years from 2002 to 2011. Equations (1) to (4) as explained in 
the methodology part represent the standard accounting relationships. The cost of 
equity is assumed as the average ROE for each category (Eqn 5). Equity is believed to 
be the most expensive form of capital. Debt is considered as less expensive due to its 
higher claim on a bank‟s assets and its tax advantage. A Corporate tax rate of 33% is 
made use of in this analysis. 
(ii) The costs of deposits, short-term and long-term wholesale debt are standardized to 
match the historical ratio of interest expense to total assets. If the cost of deposits is 
equal to some value of x%, the cost of short-term debt is assumed to be x% + 100 bps 
and the cost of long-term debt is assumed as x% + 200 bps (Eqn 6 to 8). These 
spreads are consistent with historical averages across the categories in this sample, 
and generate an upward-sloping yield curve. The share of short-term debt (less than 
one year in maturity) (rho) is considered as 25% (Eqn 10). Interest expense is then 
computed as per Eqn (11). 
(iii)Interest income is generated by interbank claims, loans and investments. Trading 
income is generated by trading assets minus trading liabilities. A portion of 
investments (θ theta) is invested in government bonds that return a risk-free rate of 
interest, while the remaining investments are made in higher-yielding securities. The 
risk premium on these higher-yielding investments is the difference between the 
return on investments and the risk-free rate (Eqn 9). 
(iv) The quantity of TCE/RWA is gradually increased in the analysis by increment of 1 
percentage point to meet specific target of RWA (Eqn 14). While the size and 
composition of the balance sheet is held constant, the relative share financed by equity 
and debt changes. An increase of TCE/RWA of 1 percentage point generates a smaller 
rise in equity as RWA are typically only 50% of total assets (Eqn 15). This increase in 
the quantity of equity is matched by a decrease in the quantity of debt (Eqn 16). As 
the most expensive form of debt, long-term debt is the first to be replaced with equity. 
(v) The change in capital structure results in increase in the bank‟s cost of capital, as tax-
advantaged debt is substituted with more expensive equity. A higher amount of equity 
for a set level of net income leads to a fall in ROE (Eqn 5). Simultaneously, part of 
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this fall in ROE is offset by the decrease in interest expense due to the decrease in 
amount of debt outstanding (Eqn 11 and 16). 
(vi) In theory, the cost of equity and debt should both decline as leverage decreases and 
the risk of default decreases. The estimates in this analysis therefore are conservative, 
as a fall in either of these costs would reduce the impact on loan spreads. Banks 
respond to the fall in ROE by raising the spreads charged on loans (α alpha, Eqn 17). 
The size of the increase in loan spreads is determined such that the increase in net 
income offsets the rise in the cost of capital, allowing ROE to be unchanged (Eqn 18). 
 
The experiment assumes that the TCE/RWA ratio is raised by increasing equity and 
reducing long-term debt correspondingly. Especially, it is assumed that (i) any higher cost of 
funding associated with this change is fully recovered completely by raising loan rates – 
100% pass through; and (ii) that the costs of equity and of debt are not affected by the lower 
riskiness of the bank. The results are obviously sensitive to a host of the assumptions in the 
analysis. The rise in lending spreads associated with a 1-percentage point increase in the 
capital ratio could be avoided by reducing operating expenses too. Certainly, there are 
enough reasons to believe that the cost of capital would decline in response to a reduction in 
bank leverage. As capital levels raise and the bank turns out to be safer, both of these costs 
tend to decline by further decreasing the impact on lending spreads. Moreover, the 
modification in the cost of capital may perhaps reduce to tax effects (Modigliani and Miller, 
1958). However, such a scenario has not been studied in arriving at the estimates presented in 
the Table 3. After having outlined the methodology and data employed for the computation 
of the stylized bank balance sheet and the income statement, this section provides the results 
of the estimations of the potential impact of raising the capital ratio on lending spreads.  
 
Table 3: Impact on lending spreads (in bps) for SCBs 
Increase in capital ratio 
(percentage points) 
Cost to meet 
capital (A) 
Cost to meet 
NFSR (B) 
A+B 
Cost to meet 
capital (C) 
Cost to meet 
NFSR (D) 
C+D 
       
 
Assuming RWAs 
unchanged  
Assuming for decline in RWAs 
0 0.00 18 18.00 0 13 13 
+1 11.40 20 31.40 8 14 22 
+2 22.80 22 45.20 15 16 31 
+3 34.20 25 59.00 23 18 41 
+4 45.60 27 72.80 30 20 50 
+5 57.00 30 86.60 38 21 59 
+6 68.40 32 100.40 46 23 68 
Source: Author‟s calculations 
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A one-percentage point increase in the ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets will push 
up bank lending spreads by 31 bps given that RWAs are unchanged (Table 3). However, the 
bank lending spread declines to 22 bps when the RWAs are assumed to decline by 20 
percentage points. Similarly, for a 2-percentage point increase, bank-lending spread would 
rise by 45 bps when RWAs are unchanged and would increase by 31 bps when RWAs are 
assumed to decrease by 20 percentage points. For a 3-percentage point increase in CAR, 
bank-lending spread would rise by 59 bps given that RWAs are believed to be unchanged and 
41 bps when RWAs are decreased by 20 percentage points. On the same lines, it was 
observed that for an increase of 4, 5 and 6-percentage points in ratio of capital to risk-
weighted assets, the bank-lending spread would increase by 73 bps, 87 bps and 100 bps given 
that RWAs are unchanged and would rise by 50 bps, 59 bps and 68 bps when RWAs are 
assumed to decrease by 20 percentage points. 
 
Elliot (2009, 2012) in his studies on the effect of tightening capital requirements on 
banks‟ lending spreads in the United States, using a method close to the one presented in this 
section, suggests that these effects are small, especially if banks are able to offset any 
increase in their funding costs by other means (e.g., a reduction in their return on equity 
(from 15% to 14%), in the remuneration of deposits and administrative costs). Further, Elliott 
observes that without these offsets, lending rates would rise by about 80 bps in the long run in 
response to a 4-percentage point increase in the ratio of equity over unweighted assets and 
lending rates would only increase by 20 bps with the adjustments. Assuming that banks 
provide only part of the credit in the economy, Elliott concludes that this 20 bps increase 
would translate into an overall increase in lending costs of 5 or 10 bps. Kashyap et al., (2010) 
have observed that the long-run costs of increasing capital requirements are likely to be small 
and state that, as a first approximation, the Modigliani-Miller theorem seems to describe 
fairly well the empirical relationship between banks‟ return on equity and their leverage. 
Higher capital ratios, as such, should significantly lower banks‟ per-unit cost of capital. Using 
data for the US, they estimate that a 4 percentage point raise in the capital to unweighted 
assets would result in the long run, to a 10 bps increase in banks‟ funding costs if tax effects 
are the only departure from Modigliani-Miller and rise only to up to 18 bps if further possible 
departures are considered. 
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Table 4: Impact on interest income (in percentage points) for SCBs  
Increase in 
capital ratio 
(percentage 
points) 
Increase in 
Income on 
loans due to 
increase in  
capital (A) 
Increase in 
Income on loans 
due to increase in  
capital in order to 
meet NSFR (B) 
A+B 
Increase in 
Income on 
loans due to 
increase in  
capital (C) 
Increase in 
Income on loans 
due to increase 
in  capital in 
order to meet 
NSFR (D) 
C+D 
        Assuming RWAs unchanged Assuming for decline in RWAs 
0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0 0 
+1 15.77 1.64 17.41 13.34 1.14 14.47 
+2 23.06 3.18 26.24 18.20 2.16 20.36 
+3 30.35 7.29 37.64 23.06 3.18 26.24 
+4 37.64 6.25 43.89 27.92 4.20 32.12 
+5 44.93 7.78 52.70 32.78 5.22 38.00 
+6 52.22 9.30 61.52 37.64 6.24 43.88 
Source: Author‟s calculations 
 
This study also estimated the impact of increases in capital and liquidity standards on 
the interest income for SCBs in India. The results of the estimations are presented in Table 4. 
Assuming that RWAs are unchanged, for 1-percentage point increase in capital ratio, interest 
income would raise by 17 percentage points. Similarly, for 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6-percentage point 
increase in capital ratio given that RWAs are unchanged, interest income would increase by 
26, 37, 44, 53 and 62 percentage points. When RWAs are assumed to be decreased by 20 
percentage points, for 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6-percentage point increase in capital ratio, interest 
income would increase by 14, 20, 26, 32, 38 and 44 percentage points. We present in Table 
4A, the results of the estimation for impact of increase in capital ratio on lending spreads for 
SCBs. A one-percentage point increase in the ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets will push 
up bank lending spreads by 15.63 bps on average given that RWAs are unchanged. However, 
the bank lending spread declines to 15.01 bps when RWAs are assumed to decline by 20% 
and rise to 21.22 bps when RWAs are assumed to increase by 20%. 
 
Table 4A: Impact on lending spreads (in bps) for SCBs - OECD Approach 
Increase in 
capital ratio 
(percentage 
point) 
Cost to meet capital 
change in lending spread (bps) 
[assuming RWAs unchanged] 
Cost to meet capital 
change in lending spread 
(bps) [assuming decline 
in RWAs] 
Cost to meet capital 
change in lending spread 
(bps) [assuming increase 
in RWAs] 
1 15.63 15.01 21.22 
2 31.26 30.02 42.44 
3 46.89 45.03 63.66 
4 62.52 60.04 84.88 
5 78.15 75.05 106.10 
6 93.78 90.06 127.32 
Source: Author‟s calculations 
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The estimated sensitivities (for scenarios like; RWAs unchanged, Increase in RWAs and 
Decrease in RWAs) of bank lending spreads to a one percentage point increase in capital 
requirements for  scheduled commercial banks are presented in  Table 4B. 
 
Table 4B: Increase in bank lending spreads for one percentage point increase  
in bank capital for SCBs - OECD approach 
(rEt -rLiabt) 
(basis points) 
LA (percentages) RWAs (percentages) (r
LAt +1 - rLAt ) 
(basis points) 
12.65 53.22 65.77 15.63 
12.65 53.22 78.92 21.22 
12.65 53.22 52.61 15.01 
Source: Author‟s calculations 
We now present the estimations of the impact on lending spreads for public sector 
banks in Table 5.  
Table 5: Impact on lending spreads (in bps) for public sector banks  
Increase in capital ratio 
(percentage points) 
Cost to meet 
capital (A) 
Cost to meet 
NFSR (B) 
A+B 
Cost to meet 
capital (C) 
Cost to meet 
NFSR (D) 
C+D 
       
 
Assuming RWAs unchanged Assuming for decline in RWAs 
0 0 16 16 0 12 12 
+1 14 15 29 10 10 20 
+2 24 11 35 17 12 29 
+3 35 19 54 24 13 37 
+4 45 22 67 31 14 46 
+5 55 24 79 38 16 54 
+6 66 26 92 45 17 62 
Source: Author‟s calculations 
 
A one-percentage point increase in the ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets will push 
up bank lending spreads by 29 bps given that RWAs are unchanged (Table 5). However, the 
bank lending spread declines to 20 bps when the RWAs are assumed to decline by 20 
percentage points. Similarly, for a 2-percentage point increase, bank-lending spread would 
rise by 35 bps when RWAs are unchanged and would increase by 29 bps when RWAs are 
assumed to decrease by 20 percentage points. For a 3-percentage point increase in CAR, 
bank-lending spread would rise by 54 bps given that RWAs are believed to be unchanged and 
37 bps when RWAs are decreased by 20 percentage points. On the same lines, for an increase 
of 4, 5 and 6-percentage points in ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets, the bank-lending 
spread would increase by 67 bps, 79 bps and 92 bps given that RWAs are unchanged and 
would rise by 46 bps, 54 bps and 62 bps when RWAs are assumed to decrease by 20 
percentage points. 
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Table 5A: Impact on lending spreads (in bps) for public sector banks - OECD approach 
Increase in 
capital ratio 
(percentage 
point) 
Cost to meet capital 
change in lending spread 
(basis points) [assuming 
RWAs unchanged] 
Cost to meet capital 
change in lending spread 
(basis points) [assuming 
decline in RWAs] 
Cost to meet capital 
change in lending spread 
(basis points) [assuming 
increase in RWAs] 
1 12.48 9.99 14.98 
2 24.96 19.98 29.96 
3 37.44 29.97 44.94 
4 49.92 39.96 59.92 
5 62.4 49.95 74.90 
6 74.88 59.94 89.88 
Source: Author‟s calculations 
For public sector banks, a one-percentage point increase in the ratio of capital to risk-
weighted assets will increase the lending spread by 12.48 bps on average given that RWAs 
are unchanged (Table 5A). However, the bank lending spread declines to approximately 10 
bps when RWAs are assumed to decline by 20% and rise to 14.98 bps when RWAs are 
assumed to increase by 20%. We present in Table 5B, the estimated sensitivities (for 
scenarios like; RWAs unchanged, increase in RWAs and decrease in RWAs) of bank lending 
spreads to a one percentage point increase in capital requirements for public sector banks. 
 
Table 5B: Increase in bank lending spreads for one percentage point increase  
in bank capital for PSBs - OECD approach 
(rEt -rLiabt) 
(basis points) 
LA 
(percentages) 
RWAs 
(percentages) 
(rLAt +1 - rLAt ) 
(basis points) 
12.65 54.73 52.54 12.48 
12.65 54.73 63.04 14.98 
12.65 54.73 42.03 9.99 
Source: Author‟s calculations 
 
Table 6: Impact on interest income (in percentage points) of public sector banks 
Increase in 
Capital Ratio 
(percentage 
points) 
Increase in 
Income on 
loans due to 
increase in  
capital (A) 
Increase in 
Income on loans 
due to increase 
in  capital in 
order to meet 
NSFR (B) 
A+B 
Increase in 
Income on 
loans due to 
increase in  
capital (C) 
Increase in 
Income on loans 
due to increase in  
capital in order to 
meet NSFR (D) 
C+D 
 
Assuming RWAs unchanged Assuming for decline in RWAs 
+1 15.63 1.55 17.18 13.35 1.07 14.42 
+2 22.48 2.99 25.47 17.92 2.03 19.94 
+3 29.33 4.43 33.76 22.48 2.99 25.47 
+4 36.18 5.86 42.05 27.05 3.94 30.99 
+5 43.03 7.30 50.33 31.62 4.90 36.52 
+6 49.88 8.74 58.62 36.18 5.86 42.05 
Source: Author‟s calculations 
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The results of the estimations of the impact of increases in capital and liquidity 
requirements on interest income (in percentage points) for public sector banks are presented 
in Table 6. Assuming that RWAs are unchanged, it is observed that for 1-percentage point 
increase in capital ratio, interest income would raise by 17 percentage points. Similarly, for 2, 
3, 4, 5 and 6-percentage point increase in capital ratio given that RWAs are unchanged, 
interest income would increase by 25, 34, 42, 50 and 58 percentage points. When RWAs are 
assumed to be decreased by 20 percentage points, for 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6-percentage point 
increase in capital ratio, interest income would increase by 14, 20, 25, 31, 37 and 42 
percentage points.  
 
We now present the estimations of the impact on lending spreads of private sector 
banks in Table 7 and Table 7A and 7B.  
Table 7: Impact on lending spreads (in bps) for private sector banks 
Increase in Capital Ratio 
(percentage points) 
cost to meet 
capital (A) 
cost to meet 
NFSR (B) 
A+B 
cost to meet 
capital (C) 
cost to meet 
NFSR (D) 
C+D 
       
 
Assuming RWAs unchanged Assuming for decline in RWAs
0 0 13 13 0 5 5 
+1 11 18 29 9 12 21 
+2 16 24 40 12 18 30 
+3 21 30 50 16 24 40 
+4 25 36 61 19 30 49 
+5 30 42 72 22 36 58 
+6 35 48 83 25 42 67 
Source: Author‟s calculations 
 
A one-percentage point increase in the ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets will push 
up bank lending spreads by 29 bps given that RWAs are unchanged (Table 7). However, the 
bank lending spread declines to 21 bps when the RWAs are assumed to decline by 20 
percentage points. Similarly, for a 2-percentage point increase, bank-lending spread would 
rise by 40 bps when RWAs are unchanged and would increase by 30 bps when RWAs are 
assumed to decrease by 20 percentage points. For a 3-percentage point increase in CAR, 
bank-lending spread would rise by 54 bps given that RWAs are believed to be unchanged and 
37 bps when RWAs are decreased by 20 percentage points. On the same lines, for an increase 
of 4, 5 and 6-percentage points in ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets, the bank-lending 
spread would increase by 61 bps, 72 bps and 83 bps given that RWAs are unchanged and 
would rise by 49 bps, 58 bps and 67 bps when RWAs are assumed to decrease by 20 
percentage points.  
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Estimations under OECD approach for private banks, a one-percentage point increase 
in the ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets will raise the lending spread by 22.48 bps on 
average given that RWAs are unchanged. However, the bank lending spread declines to 
approximately 17.98 bps when RWAs are assumed to decline by 20% and rise to 26.98 bps 
when RWAs are assumed to increase by 20% (Table 7A). 
Table 7A: Impact on lending spreads (in bps) for private sector banks - OECD approach 
Increase in 
capital ratio 
(percentage 
point) 
Cost to meet capital 
change in lending spread 
(basis points) [assuming 
RWAs unchanged] 
Cost to meet capital 
change in lending spread 
(basis points) [assuming 
decline in RWAs] 
Cost to meet capital 
change in lending spread 
(basis points) [assuming 
increase in RWAs] 
1 22.48 17.98 26.98 
2 44.96 35.96 53.96 
3 67.44 53.94 80.94 
4 89.92 71.92 107.92 
5 112.40 89.9 134.90 
6 134.88 107.88 161.88 
Source: Author‟s calculations 
The estimated sensitivities (for scenarios like; RWAs unchanged, increase in RWAs and 
decrease in RWAs) of bank lending spreads to a one percentage point increase in capital 
requirements for  private sector banks are presented in  Table 7B. 
 
Table 7B: Increase in bank lending spreads for one percentage point increase  
in bank capital for private sector banks - OECD approach 
(rEt -rLiabt) 
(basis points) 
LA (percentages) RWAs (percentages) 
(rLAt +1 - rLAt ) 
(basis points) 
11.59 49.53 96.09 22.48 
11.59 49.53 115.38 26.98 
11.59 49.53 76.87 17.98 
Source: Author‟s calculations 
 
Table 8: Impact on Interest Income (in percentage points) of private sector banks 
Increase in 
Capital Ratio 
(percentage 
points) 
Increase in 
Income on 
loans due to 
increase in  
capital (A) 
Increase in 
Income on loans 
due to increase in  
capital in order to 
meet NSFR (B) 
A+B 
Increase in 
Income on 
loans due to 
increase in  
capital (C) 
Increase in 
Income on 
loans due to 
increase in  
capital in 
order to meet 
NSFR (D) 
C+D 
       
 
Assuming RWAs unchanged Assuming for decline in RWAs 
+1 13.08 1 14 12.12 0.65 12.77 
+2 15.97 1 17 14.04 1.06 15.10 
+3 18.86 2 21 15.97 1.46 17.43 
+4 21.75 3 24 17.89 1.87 19.76 
+5 24.63 3 28 19.82 2.27 22.09 
+6 27.52 4 31 21.75 2.68 24.42 
Source: Author‟s calculations 
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The results of the estimations of the impact of increases in capital and liquidity 
requirements on Interest Income (in percentage points) for public sector banks are presented 
in Table 8. Assuming that RWAs are unchanged, it is observed that for 1-percentage point 
increase in capital ratio, interest income would raise by 14 percentage points. Similarly, for 2, 
3, 4, 5 and 6-percentage point increase in capital ratio given that RWAs are unchanged, 
interest income would increase by 17, 21, 24, 28 and 31 percentage points. When RWAs are 
assumed to be decreased by 20 percentage points, for 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6-percentage point 
increase in capital ratio, interest income would increase by 13, 15, 17, 20, 22 and 24 
percentage points. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this study, we have modelled the impact of new capital regulations under Basel III 
proposals on the profitability of banks. We estimate that one-percentage point increase in the 
ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets will push up bank lending spreads by 31 basis points 
(bps) given that RWAs are unchanged. However, the bank lending spread declines to 22 bps 
when the RWAs are assumed to decline by 20 percentage points.  
 
On a comparison of increase in bank lending spreads for a one-percentage point 
increase in capital ratio of bank groups, it is observed that private banks experience 
significant lending spread when compared other categories of banks. Further, the results of 
this study are comparable to other contemporary international studies. On a comparison of 
the estimates for USA, Euro region, Japan and India, the sensitivity is found to be 
comparatively greater in the United States (mainly due to a higher return on equity and a 
higher share of risk-weighted assets in bank balance sheets) and lower in Japan (mostly due 
to a lower return on equity and a higher share of lending assets in bank balance sheets) 
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